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In this paper, we explore how people revise their belief in a hypothesis and the reliability 
of sources in circumstances where those sources are either independent or are partially 
dependent because of their shared, common, background. Specifically, we examine 
people’s revision of perceived source reliability by comparison with a formal model of 
reliability revision proposed by Bovens and Hartmann (2003). This model predicts a u-
shaped trajectory for revision in certain circumstances:  If a source provides a positive 
report for an unlikely hypothesis, perceived source reliability should decrease; as 
additional positive reports emerge, however, estimates of reliability should increase. 
Participants’ updates in our experiment show this u-shaped pattern. Furthermore, 
participants’ responses also respect a second feature of the model, namely that perceived 
reliability should once again decrease when it becomes known that the sources are 
partially dependent. Participants revise appropriately both when a specific shared 
reliability is observed (e.g. sources went to the same, low quality school) and when 
integrating the possibility of shared reliability. These findings shed light on how people 
gauge source reliability and integrate reports when multiple sources weigh in on an issue 
as seen in public debates.  
 
Keywords: Bayesian reasoning; Reliability revision; Sequential testimonies 
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Introduction 
In everyday life, we not only continuously receive evidence from others on 
everything from the weather, through politics, to science; we also frequently receive 
evidence from multiple sources on the same issue.  These sources may be independent of 
one another, producing data and conclusions in isolation from our other sources. 
However, in many, if not most, circumstances, they will exhibit some degree of 
dependence: they may share a common background, share a common information source, 
or even discuss their evidence prior to providing individual reports.   
A failure to appreciate the dependence of information can lead to potentially 
disastrous conclusions. For example, an intelligence agency may receive multiple reports 
concerning weapons of mass destruction in a foreign country, and increase their belief 
that those weapons of mass destruction exist.  Multiple congruent reports may sway the 
agency to believe what was initially an improbable hypothesis. If it subsequently 
becomes known that all reports came from sources with a common, flawed approach, the 
corroboration these reports seemed to provide is compromised. That is, an appropriate 
appreciation for the dependence among, or independence of sources is critical to 
reasoning and decision-making.  
The paper examines belief revision processes concerning both a claim at issue and 
the reliability of the reporting sources under conditions of either independence or partial 
dependence. In exploring this, we use a formal, Bayesian account of dependence and 
reliability (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003, chapter 3).  
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The impact of source reliability on belief revision1 
The reliability of one’s sources is crucial for everyday reasoning and decision-
making. Because so much of human knowledge comes from the testimony of others, the 
impact of source reliability has received considerable empirical attention. Source 
reliability has been shown to influence the reception of persuasive messages (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984; Tormala & Clarkson, 2007), the development of children’s perception of 
the world (Harris & Corriveau, 2011), legal reasoning (Lagnado et al., 2013), adherence 
with persuasion strategies (Cialdini, 2007), and how people are seen in social situations 
(Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Glick & Beninger, 2011). There has also been 
increased interest in lay people’s understanding of the impact of source dependence (see 
e.g., Yousif, Aboody & Keil, 2019). 
 Cognitive and social psychology have approached source reliability in a number 
of ways. While reliance on the reliability of others has typically been viewed as a shallow 
persuasive cue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), cognitive and developmental psychologists 
have tended to stress how sensitivity to source characteristics is rationally justified (see 
e.g., Hahn, Harris & Corner, 2009; Collins et al. 2018). At the same time, research has 
differed in the extent to which it separates the reliability of a source into distinct aspects 
(such as accuracy, trustworthiness, or bias, see e.g., Schum, 1994; Pornpitakpan, 2004), 
or simply rolls these into one overall measure of source reliability that reflects their 
combined net effect (e.g., Hahn et al., 2009). 
 
1 Some research uses the term ’source credibility’ for ’reliability’. For the sake of parsimony, here we only 
use ’reliability’.  
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Harris, Hahn, Madsen & Hsu (2015) tested a probabilistic model that amalgamates 
two components of reliability: perceived trustworthiness and perceived expertise. 
Expertise refers to the capacity to provide accurate information about the topic. This is 
domain-dependent. For example, a carpenter can provide relevant and accurate 
information about types of wood, but may not be able to provide guidance on 
neurosurgery. Trust, on the other hand, refers to the intention to provide true and accurate 
information to the best of one’s ability. For example, if the carpenter has a motive to sell 
surplus wood, she may falsely claim a particular type of wood is useful even in situations 
where it is not. Expertise and trustworthiness are orthogonal such that a person can be 
highly expert, but very untrustworthy and vice versa. However, these two factors 
ultimately combine to determine how likely it is that a source’s testimony genuinely 
reflects the truth or falsity of a claim. This makes probabilistic models a natural way for 
thinking about sources and their reliability. As a result, Bayesian, probabilistic models of 
source reliability can now be found in the epistemology and philosophy of science 
literature (e.g., Olsson, 2005; Olsson, 2011; Bovens & Hartmann, 2003), in cognitive 
psychology (e.g., Harris et al., 2015; Hahn, Harris & Corner, 2016; Pilditch, Hahn & 
Lagnado, 2018) and in developmental psychology (e.g. Shafto, Goodman & Frank, 
2012). 
Bayesian approaches to reasoning represent (subjective) degrees of belief with 
probabilities, and use Bayes’ rule for belief revision (Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Howson 
& Urbach, 1996). The Bayesian approach was suggested as an alternative to logicist 
approaches to reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1991) and has successfully been applied to 
evidential reasoning in a wide range of contexts (e.g. Lagnado, Gerstenberg & Zultan, 
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2015; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Oaksford & Chater, 1994) as well as to argumentation 
(Hahn & Oaksford, 2006; 2007; 2014). This work suggests Bayesian reasoning can 
capture much of information integration in everyday reasoning.  
In this paper, we examine reasoning about source reliability and the veracity of a 
source’s claim with reference to a Bayesian source credibility model first proposed by 
Bovens and Hartmann (2003). A full formal description of the model is provided in the 
Supplementary Material, so we limit our introduction here to its most salient features. 
The model represents an agent’s beliefs about claims and sources, and is used to revise 
those beliefs in light of new evidence. The overall ‘reliability’ of a source (which may 
itself reflect a range of factors that are not modelled in detail) is represented by a 
probability, P(Rel), that is, a number between 0 and 1. This number represents the agent’s 
subjective degree of belief that the source has the capacity and willingness to provide 
accurate information about the hypothesis at issue. In Boven’s and Hartmann’s basic 
(2003) model, a source faithfully reports the truth when reliable, whereas if the source is 
unreliable, their testimony is unrelated to the truth or falsity of the claim at issue, and as 
good as flipping a coin.2 Hence a probability of 1 for reliability (i.e., P(Rel) = 1) means 
the agent is 100% certain that the source reliably reports the truth. A probability of P(Rel) 
= .7 means the agent is 70% certain, and so on.  This perceived reliability determines how 
much weight the source’s testimonial report is given, that is, it determines the evidential 
value assigned to that report. On receiving a source’s report, agents then use Bayes’ rule 
to revise their belief in the claim at issue.   
 
2 It is also possible to represent bias on the part of the source (see Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; and, in the context of 
fitting experimental data, Jarvstad & Hahn, 2011), but we make no use of this in the modelling here. 
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At the same time, however, agents revise their beliefs in the reliability of the 
reporting source, once again using Bayes’ rule. In other words, agents use testimonial 
reports to jointly revise beliefs both about the underlying claim and the source itself. 
Where the testimonial report has an unexpected content (i.e., prior to the current degree 
of belief about the claim at issue), agents modify their belief in the claim in line with that 
report, but they also somewhat reduce their degree of belief that the source is reliable. By 
contrast, when a report is in line with present beliefs about the claim, belief in the 
reliability of the source is increased. 
In short, the Bovens and Hartmann (2003) model implements a strategy for dealing 
with the testimony of sources whose reliability is not fully known, as is frequent in many 
real-world contexts. It is a common feature of real-world testimony that the recipient does 
not know exactly how reliable the source is (and in some contexts, such as exchanges via 
social media, the recipient may, in fact, know nothing about the source at all). The 
Bovens and Hartmann model is an attempt to provide a rational solution to this common 
place difficulty, and it is one of a family of formal models that implement the intuitive 
reliability updating strategy just outlined (for other implementations see e.g., Olsson, 
2011). This strategy, which has been labelled “expectation-based updating” by Collins et 
al. (2018), can be found in lay reasoners as evidenced both by experimental manipulation 
(e.g., Collins et al., 2018; Collins & Hahn, subm.) and model-fitting (e.g., Harris et al., 
2015; Shafto et al., 2012). It has also been examined in simulations both with individual 
agents (Hahn, Merdes & von Sydow, 2018) and in societies of artificial agents (Madsen 
& Pilditch, 2018; Madsen, Bailey & Pilditch, 2018; Hahn, von Sydow & Merdes, 2019). 
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As detailed in the introduction, we often receive information about a claim from 
more than one party, whether these are multiple witnesses in a trial, reporters from 
different media organizations, scientists from different labs, or simply different friends 
and acquaintances speaking to the same issue (see e.g. Philipps, Hahn & Pilditch, 2018; 
Madsen, Hahn & Pilditch, 2018). This makes it essential to probe how lay reasoners deal 
with multiple sources, and how they accommodate a key feature of multiple sources in 
the real world, namely that these sources may not be wholly independent.  
Shared reliability and reliability revision 
Not only have past studies of belief revision tended to focus on contexts in which 
there is a single source of evidence, they have also tended to focus on belief in the claim 
at issue itself. This focus makes sense, as it will be that claim which motivates or 
influences decisions such as voting, economic behavior, etc. and, from that perspective, 
the reliability of a testimonial source seems simply like an auxiliary factor in revising 
beliefs about that claim.  
However, perceived reliability should moderate the impact of testimonial evidence. 
This follows from normative Bayesian models that spell out how rational agents should 
revise their beliefs (e.g., Hahn et al., 2009), if they want those beliefs to be as accurate as 
possible (see Pettigrew, 2016), and it can be seen descriptively in many studies of 
evidential reasoning, argumentation and persuasion (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; 
Corner & Hahn, 2009; Lagnado et al., 2015). This means the perception of source 
reliability itself is important in the belief revision process. Therefore, if the perceived 
reliability of the source changes, Bayesian normative models suggest the subsequent 
impact of that source should change also. For example, the Boy Who Cried Wolf made 
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repeated bad forecasts (willingly), causing villagers to decrease their estimates of his 
reliability, with disastrous consequences.  
Here, the villagers had access to actual outcomes (no wolves were actually 
observed), but in many contexts, cognitive agents do not have access to a forecasting 
history from their sources. In such circumstances, the expectation-based reliability 
updating strategy described above seems reasonable, and the Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003) model provides a normative, Bayesian implementation. This model can capture 
the belief dynamics involved with one or more evidence reports from a single source. But 
it can also be used to capture reports from multiple sources. In this case, the belief 
dynamics vary depending on whether or not those sources are independent.  
Within the Bayesian Framework, graphical models (so-called Bayesian Belief 
Networks, see Pearl, 1988) are widely used to represent (in)dependence relations between 
variables, and these graphical models can be used to simplify Bayesian computations. 
Variables are represented as nodes, and arrows between nodes represent dependencies. 
Fig. 1 shows a simple graphical representation of multiple independent witnesses in the 
Bovens and Hartmann model.  
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Fig. 1: Independent condition. Each source has an independent reliability (Rel) and 
provides a report (Rep) about a hypothesis (H), conditionally independent of other 
sources. 
 
There is an underlying claim at issue (represented by the variable H, for hypothesis, 
which can take on the values true or false). The variables Rep1 to RepN represent 
testimonial reports, which assert the hypothesis to be true or false. The variables Rel1 to 
RelN represent the reliability of sources 1 to N respectively. The arrows leading to the 
report variables (from both hypothesis and reliability nodes) indicate that the source’s 
report is determined by two factors: the true state of the world and their reliability. 
Crucially, there are no links between reporters or their reliabilities in Fig. 1, indicating 
that the sources provide their reports entirely independently. For example, climate 
scientists may conduct independent studies of the same phenomenon and produce reports 
of their findings without any knowledge of the conclusions of other teams. This would 
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constitute fully independent sources, as they do not rely on the same apparatus, do not 
share results before making their reports known, and do not communicate between teams.  
However, sources may also be dependent in multiple ways (see, in a climate 
context, for example Hahn, Corner & Harris, 2016). One such source of dependence is a 
shared common background. The graphical model of Fig. 2 represents this type of partial 
dependence.  Here, there are still no direct links between report variables, indicating that 
sources provide these without conferring. However, there is an indirect dependence 
through the shared background variable (SR) which provides a common influence on all 
sources’ reliability. In other words, the respective reliabilities, Rel1 to RelN, may still vary 
individually, but are influenced by a common cause. An example of this might be a joint 
educational background (e.g., economists coming from the same good or bad school) that 
shapes the sources’ interpretation of the data.  
This dependency provides a constraint on the informativeness of each source and 
changes the belief dynamics.  
12 
 
 
Fig. 2: Shared Reliability condition. All source reliabilities (Rel) now share a common 
ancestor "shared reliability" (SR; e.g. shared background). 
 
In particular, the fact that the reliability of these sources is now conditional on a 
common background can weaken the normative impact of their reports. In other words, it 
can weaken the extent to which those reports should change beliefs about the claim. For 
example, if several doctors provide diagnoses for a patient, it makes an operational 
difference to the impact of their reports if they were found to all have attended the same 
low standard medical course. In comparison to a fully independent case, recipients should 
treat reports from these doctors as partially compromised. This shared background not 
only influences the reliability of each source, but in turn influences the degree to which 
reports from those sources impact the hypothesis / claim.  
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The graphical models of Fig. 1 and 2 are not just visual aids. Each corresponds to a 
set of equations (see Bovens and Hartmann, 2003, reprinted here in the Supplementary 
Material), that allows for calculation of not only how beliefs in the claim at issue change 
as one or more testimonial reports came in, but also how these reports lead to changes in 
the perceived reliabilities. It is these changes in perceived reliability that we examine in 
the present paper, together with participants degree of belief in the underlying claim.  
More specifically, we test if lay people’s intuitions are qualitatively in line with the 
dynamics of the model. We describe the experimental hypotheses in more detail in the 
following.  
Present Research 
In the paper, we explore four hypotheses.  
H1: Do participants revise their belief in the reliability of the source in line with 
Bayesian predictions? For improbable hypotheses (in their example, Bovens and 
Hartmann use a probability of the hypothesis, P(H) = 0.3), a single positive report should 
decrease the reliability of the source. However, given further concurring reports from 
independent sources, the perceived source reliability should increase. This happens as the 
recipient receives multiple corroborative reports for the same unlikely hypothesis. In this 
study, sources report that the hypothesis is true (i.e., they provide a ‘positive’ report for 
the hypothesis).  
H2: In line with Bayesian predictions, sources that provide positive statements for 
highly likely hypotheses (e.g. P(H) = .9) should increase in reliability, albeit less so than 
the decreases in H1.  
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H3: Do participants use source dependency to adjust reliability estimations? If 
sources are wholly independent, participants should, normatively, update in line with the 
predictions tested in the first hypothesis. If, however, sources are partially dependent (via 
their shared background), this pattern should change. Specifically, if the recipient learns 
that three sources, initially believed to be independent, draw their reports from the same 
source (e.g. a shared source or shared affiliation), the recipient should reduce her belief in 
the hypothesis and the credibility of sources to fit perception of the shared reliability. For 
example, if three economists independently state the economy is about to crash, a 
recipient may increase her belief in this hypothesis considerably given the independence.  
However, if the recipient subsequently learns the economists are employed at the same 
company, she may decrease the belief in the hypothesis, as the sources are dependent. We 
explore this hypothesis in two stages; first, when providing participants with a specific, 
observed instance of a shared background (e.g. high- or low-quality schooling of sources; 
Experiment 1), and second the more complex case where participants must integrate the 
possibility of a shared background (which could be high- or low-quality: Experiment 2). 
H4: Do participants adjust reliability estimates of sources retrospectively, or do 
additional reports only result in updates to the most recent (reporting) sources? That is, 
after the first report, participants provide their reliability estimate for this first reporting 
source. We explore whether seeing subsequent positive reports from other sources for the 
same hypothesis leads to a revision of the reliability of the original source despite the fact 
that this source does not contribute additional reports. This should happen, as the 
recipient learns the source, initially discredited for providing an unlikely report, might be 
a reliable source given multiple corroborative reports from other (independent) sources. If 
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participants revise their beliefs about the reliability of the source retroactively, we should 
see no differences between estimates of the source reliability for each of the sources 
(given new reports), as previous sources are also revised in light of new reports. If, 
however, participants do not revise beliefs retrospectively, the reliability of individual 
sources should differ, as participants learn additional information.  
Experiment 1: Method3 
To test the above hypotheses, we employ the following methodology: To test H1 & 
H2, the prior probability of the hypothesis is manipulated as high/low. This allows 
exploration of whether perceived reliability initially decreases and then subsequently 
increases given additional positive reports for highly unlikely statements (H1) and if 
providing positive reports for highly likely statements does not exhibit this effect (H2). 
To test H3, additional corroborating sources are incrementally introduced, followed by an 
SR manipulation. SR was presented as either a shared high reliability influence (a school 
with an excellent reputation) or a shared low reliability influence (a school with a poor 
reputation). This allowed us to explore the simpler case of sensitivity to the observed 
quality of the SR. To test H4, P(H) as well as P(RelN) estimates are elicited after each 
report for both the hypothesis and for every source (meaning P(Rel1), the perceived 
reliability of source1 is elicited three times, once after each positive report). Note that the 
initial, prior reliability of the three sources was elicited with a single judgment pertaining 
to that type of source. 
 
3 The study was approved by the Department of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee of 
Birkbeck, University of London (reference 161754/5).   
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Participants: 100 participants (58 female, Mage = 30.09, SD = 10.44) were recruited 
from the online recruitment source Prolific Academic. All had to be aged 18+ and be 
native English speakers from either the UK or US. Median completion time was 5.25 min 
(SD = 3.95) and participants were paid £1.00 (resulting in an effective hourly wage of 
£11.42/hour for participation). 
Experiment 1: Materials and procedure 
Materials: In order to test the above hypotheses, two scenarios were used. In 
scenario 1 (low probability condition), participants were asked to consider the likelihood 
of a market crash within a 6-month period. Specifically, they saw the following:  
 
“Imagine you are watching a news programme about the economy. Specifically, 
the programme considers whether or not the UK stock market will crash (i.e. fall by 
more than 30%) within the next 6 months. Historically, the likelihood of a crash 
occurring within a 6-month window is 5%.  
 
In your opinion, how likely is the UK stock market to crash within the next 6 
months?” 
 
Scenario 2 (high probability condition) considers the likelihood that the salmon 
population will grow within a 5-year period. Specifically, participants saw the following:  
 
“Imagine you are watching a nature programme about fish. Specifically, the programme 
considers whether or not the salmon population of Norway will grow (i.e. increase by 
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more than 10%) over the next 5 years. Historically, the likelihood of an increase in the 
salmon population in Norway within a 5-year window is 85%.     
 
In your opinion, how likely is the salmon population of Norway will grow over the next 
5 years?”  
 
In addition to the scenarios, participants were presented with statements from 
experts in the field (economist and biologists)4. This allowed for reliability measures of 
the sources. For the biological scenario, they saw the following:  
 
“Reliability can be defined as having access to relevant information about a topic, and 
a willingness to say what you believe to be the true state of the world.  
 
How reliable are biologists in predicting the growth of species?”  
 
To generate reports about the hypothesis, participants were told experts had been 
interviewed. Specifically, they saw the following:  
 
“Now, imagine that a biologist, Linda, is being interviewed about the salmon. Linda 
states the following: “I am completely certain the salmon population of Norway will 
grow over the next 5 years.”  
 
 
4 50% of the named experts were female.  
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Given Linda’s report, how likely is it the salmon population of Norway will grow over 
the next 5 years?” 
 
Finally, to generate SR conditions (high and low), the participants were told the 
experts had attended the same school. Specifically, they saw the following:  
 
“It turns out, all the interviewed biologists studied at the same school and subscribe to 
the same biological models. Their school has a very good reputation for excellent 
teaching and accurate approaches to biology [High-quality SR condition]// Their 
school has a very bad reputation for sloppy teaching and out-dated approaches to 
biology [Low-quality SR condition].  
 
Given the fact that they all studied at the same school and follow the same biological 
models, how likely is it the salmon population of Norway will grow over the next 5 
years?” 
 
In all, the materials included elicitation of prior beliefs (P(H) and the prior reliability of 
the type of source(s), P(RelProfession), and posterior beliefs regarding the hypothesis and 
the reliability of the source after each report, i.e. P(H|Rep1,….,RepN) and P(Rel1-N|Rep1, 
…RepN), where N refers to the total number of sources who have provided reports at the 
point of measurement. Posterior beliefs are elicited after each report (in the current 
design, after reports 1, 2, and 3) and after the subsequent SR manipulation (high and low-
quality). 
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 Procedure: Participants first provided prior estimates for their beliefs in the 
hypothesis on a scale from 0-100 (0: I am completely certain the stock market will NOT 
crash within the next 6 months; 100: I am completely certain the stock market will crash 
within the next 6 months) and their belief in the reliability of the type of source 
(economist or biologist) from 0-100 (0: biologists are completely unreliable; 100: 
biologists are completely reliable).  
 Having provided their priors, participants saw sequential reports from experts (in 
total, participants read 3 reports, all of whom were positive). After each report, 
participants provided their degree of belief in the hypothesis as well as their degree of 
belief in the reliability of each source that had reported so far (thus, the reliability of 
source1 was elicited three times, but the reliability of source3 was only elicited once, after 
the third report).  
 Finally, participants were asked to “…consider two possible continuations to the 
scenario, providing your assessments for each”. They then read both SR conditions and 
were asked to provide their degree of belief in the hypothesis and in the reliability of each 
expert given the dependency between the experts.  
The study was a mixed design. Within-subjects, participants saw both scenarios 
(high and low likelihood). Between-subjects, and in order to manipulate shared 
reliability, half of participants were told the sources came from a good school (high-
quality SR condition) and the other half were told the sources had graduated from a 
school with a poor reputation (low-quality SR condition). Thus, for each scenario (low 
and high probability), participants were given 3 reports for each scenario (all confirming 
the hypothesis), followed by the SR condition statement. Which scenario was presented 
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first (high or low probability) was counterbalanced, and whether a scenario was followed 
by a high or low-quality SR condition statement was manipulated between-subjects, 
independently for each scenario.  
Experiment 1: Results 
All inferential statistics reported below were Bayesian5, and were conducted using 
the JASP statistical software (JASP Team, 2019). The resulting Bayes factors (BF10) 
detail the likelihood ratio of the data given the experimental hypothesis, over the data 
given the null. In other words, BFs indicate how much more likely the data are assuming 
that the experimental hypothesis is true, than it would be under the null hypothesis of no 
difference. BFs of 1-3 may be considered anecdotal support; 3-10 as “substantial” 
support; 10-30 as “strong” support; 30-100 as “very strong”; and >100 as “decisive” 
(Jeffreys, 1961; but for further explanation on the use of Bayesian statistics, see Kruschke 
& Liddell, 2018; Wagenmakers, 2007).  
The probability manipulations were successful in generating high and low estimates 
for the two scenarios: The market crash scenario was rated as unlikely (M = .32, SD = 
.23) and the salmon growth scenario was rated as likely (M = .81, SD = .15) . The 
scenario with the unlikely prior was particularly fortunate, as Bovens and Hartmann use 
P(H) = .3 as the example in their book, making the current scenario comparable to their 
example. For reliability, Bovens and Hartmann use P(Rel) = .5. Participants rated both 
sources in our scenarios higher (P(RelEconomist): M = .60, SD = .22; P(RelBiologist): M = .73, 
SD = .16). Importantly, though, both sources were rated positively, which allowed us to 
 
5 All analyses used the default JASP (uninformed) prior. 
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test whether positive reports of unlikely hypotheses influenced reliability estimates 
negatively.  
To test whether participants revise their belief in the reliability of the source in line 
with Bayesian predictions (hypothesis 1), we explore if participants adjusted reliability 
estimates in the initial source given sequential testimonies. Bayesian predictions dictated 
that positive reports of an unlikely hypothesis should initially decrease estimates of 
reliability. 
 
Figure. 3. Displayed are the mean participant estimate of the probability that the claim, H, 
is true, before receipt of the reports and then after receipt of each of the three, 
sequentially received, testimonial reports, along with the mean estimate of the reliability 
of source 1, Rel1, prior to any reports, P(Rel1), and then after each additional report (i.e., 
P(Rel1|Rep1), P(Rel1|Rep1,Rep2) and P(Rel1|Rep1,Rep2,Rep3)) both for likely, (P(H) = .81, 
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and unlikely, P(H) = .32), scenarios. Error bars reflect +/- 1 Standard Error. The y-axis 
shows estimated probabilities expressed in decimal form (0-1). Data are plotted 
separately for the high- and low likelihood condition 
 
In line with the predictions of the Bayesian model, using a repeated measures 
ANOVA (P(Rel1) – P(Rel1|Rep1))
6 , the perceived reliability of source 1 is revised 
negatively (i.e. decreases compared with baseline reliability) given a positive report of an 
unlikely hypothesis (N = 100), BF10 = 10907.7 (in the current design, the source predicts 
the stock market will crash within a 6-month period). However (and also in line with 
Bayesian model predictions), as participants learn other experts provide corroborating 
reports (P(Rel1|Rep1) – P(Rel1|Rep1, Rep2,Rep3)), they revise their belief in the initial 
source and revise reliability in a positive direction (N = 100), BF10 = 1.36 * 10
11. This 
specifically tested a scenario with a low prior probability (here, P(H) = .32).  
In addition, participants increase their belief in the likelihood of the hypothesis 
whilst they simultaneously decrease belief in the source reliability (P(H) to P(H|Rep1); N 
= 100), BF10 = 1.94 * 10
6. While the paper focuses on testing the former (change in 
reliability), it is worth noting the participants do follow previous findings (e.g. Harris et 
al., 2015) that show P(H|Rep) increases if the source is viewed as reliable.  
To test whether sources that provide positive statements for highly likely 
hypotheses increase their reliability (hypothesis 2), we conducted a repeated measures 
ANOVA (P(Rel1) to P(Rel1|Rep1, Rep2 ,Rep3)) to see if the reports change the estimation 
 
6 Where P(Rel1) = P(RelProfession), that is, the prior reliability of source 1 is the generic prior for that type of source 
(economist or biologist). 
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of the reliability of the biologist. While there is a substantial increase in reliability as 
more reports are given (N = 100), BF10 = 3.21, we note this difference is small (can be 
seen visually in Fig. 3 where P(Rel) remains fairly flat).  
 
The introduction of shared reliability 
To test whether source independence impacts reliability estimations (hypothesis 3), 
we compared posterior degrees of belief in the hypothesis and the reliability of the 
sources before and after a shared reliability (SR) of either observed high- or low-quality 
is introduced. As described in the above, we manipulate the reliability of the SR and 
compare P(H|Rep1, Rep2, Rep3) with P(H| Rep1, Rep2, Rep3, SR) and P(Rel1|Rep1, Rep2, 
Rep3) with P(Rel1| Rep1, Rep2, Rep3, SR) for high and low quality SR conditions.  
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on belief in the hypothesis (P(H)) for 
the introduction of the shared reliability information (i.e. P(H|Rep1, Rep2, Rep3) to P(H| 
Rep1, Rep2, Rep3, SR)), with the inclusion of the shared reliability condition (high/low-
quality) as a between-subjects condition. 
In line with predictions for the unlikely scenario, there was a substantial decrease in 
the belief that the claim at issue was true (economic crash), given the introduction of 
shared reliability (main effect of introduction), BFInclusion
7 = 5.05 * 108, along with a main 
effect of shared reliability condition (low-quality < high-quality), BFInclusion = 3193.73, 
demonstrating a successful manipulation check. Importantly, the substantial interaction of 
shared reliability condition, and its introduction, BFInclusion = 209.81, revealed belief in the 
 
7 BFInclusion shows the change in odds from the sum of the prior probabilities of models including the effect, to the 
sum of the posterior probabilities of models including the effect.  
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hypothesis decreased more substantially when the shared reliability was low-quality. 
Consequently, the model with all the above terms included was the best fit, BFM
8 = 
209.81, and substantial overall, BF10 = 6.16 * 10
10. We observe the same effects for 
revision of reliability estimates. There is not only a general decrease in reliability 
estimates given the introduction of a shared reliability, BFInclusion = 3.64 * 10
9, but also a 
main effect of shared reliability condition (low-quality < high-quality), BFInclusion = 
756483.62, with more substantial decreases in estimated reliability when the introduced 
shared reliability is low-quality, BFInclusion = 9987.20. Once again, the model with all the 
above terms included was the best fit, BFM = 9987.2, and substantial overall, BF10 = 2.57 
* 1012. 
The above analyses were then repeated for the likely scenario, where, in line with 
predictions, the belief in the hypothesis (salmon growth) was found to substantially 
decrease when a shared reliability is introduced, BFInclusion = 210.95. When shared 
reliability was low-quality, belief in the hypothesis was substantially lower than when 
shared reliability was high-quality, BFInclusion = 1031.85, demonstrating a successful 
manipulation check. Lastly, the substantial interaction of shared reliability introduction, 
and its quality, BFInclusion = 347.93, indicated that the decrease in belief in the hypothesis 
was local to the low-quality shared reliability condition only. The model with the above 
terms included was the best fit, BFM = 347.93, and substantial overall, BF10 = 5394.15. 
We again observe the same trends for the updating of source reliability given the 
introduction of a shared reliability. More precisely, the introduction of shared reliability 
is found to decrease estimations of source reliability, BFInclusion = 1.24 * 10
10, and whether 
 
8 BFM shows the change from prior to posterior odds, given the model.  
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a shared reliability was high or low-quality led to higher or lower reliability estimates 
(respectively), BFInclusion = 4.64 * 10
10, once more passing the manipulation check. 
Critically, once more reductions in reliability, given the introduction of a shared 
reliability among sources, is found to be localized to when the introduced shared 
reliability is of low-quality (right-hand facet, Fig. 4), BFInclusion = 2.71 * 10
7. Finally, the 
model with the above terms included was the best fit, BFM = 2.71 * 10
7, and substantial 
overall, BF10 = 1.65 * 10
14.  
 
 
Figure. 4: Mean participant estimate of the probability that the claim after the third 
testimonial report, P(H|Rep1,Rep2,Rep3) along with the mean estimate of the reliability of 
source 1 after the third testimonial report P(Rel1|Rep1,Rep2,Rep3). Mean participant 
estimate of the probability that the claim after learning sources are dependent, P(H| Rep1, 
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Rep2, Rep3,SR) along with the mean estimate of the reliability of source 1 after learning 
sources are dependent P(Rel1| Rep1, Rep2, Rep3,SR), split by SR condition (facet) and 
scenario (linetype; P(H) = .81 and P(H) = .32). Error bars reflect +/- 1 Standard Error. 
The y-axis shows estimated probabilities expressed in decimal form (0-1). Data are 
plotted separately for the high- and low likelihood condition 
 
To test whether participants adjust reliability estimates of sources retrospectively, 
or if additional reports only reflect on the most recent sources (hypothesis 4), we 
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA across the source reliability estimates of all 
sources. Specifically, we compared participant reliability estimates of source1 after all 
reports have been provided. This revealed a null difference9 in estimated reliabilities 
between sources in the unlikely scenario (N = 100), BF10 = 0.167, and likely scenario (N 
= 100), BF10 = 0.066. This suggests people update their belief in source1 retroactively 
given new reports from additional sources, even if source1 does not contribute with 
additional reports, in line with Bayesian model predictions.   
Experiment 1: Discussion 
Broadly, the results from Experiment 1 support the main hypotheses that 
participants are appropriately sensitive to the likelihood of a hypothesis, the impact of 
single confirmatory reports, and subsequent corroboration (both in terms of the updated 
likelihood of the hypothesis, and the updated reliabilities of reporting sources). 
Importantly, when specific observed instances of shared reliability are introduced (e.g., 
 
9 The use of Bayesian statistics allowed us to infer the strength for the null hypothesis, whereby BFs less than 1/3rd 
may be considered substantial support for the null (Dienes, 2014). 
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high- or low-quality schooling), participants update their models of the world 
appropriately. This suggests participants can handle reasoning from specific observations 
of shared reliability.  
Notably, in Exp. 1 participants are asked to revise their beliefs in light of a 
particular value for the shared reliability variable. This leaves open the question of 
whether lay reasoners would be sensitive to the structural dependency per se. Experiment 
2 builds upon this by introducing to participants only the structure (i.e. possibility) of 
shared reliability, such that participants must evaluate whether this shared dependence 
influences their model of the world (relative to the independent equivalent) in and of 
itself. Put another way, does learning that the experts went to the same school lead to an 
appropriate revision of reliabilities and the hypothesis, despite not knowing the quality of 
that schooling? 
 
Experiment 2: Method 
Experiment 2 tests the introduction of shared reliability structure, without specific 
observations of its quality. As such, Experiment 2 follows the method of Experiment 1, 
except for the manipulation of shared reliability versus independence (see below).  
Participants: As in Experiment 1, 100 participants (64 female. Mage 35.19, SD = 
12.77), subject to the same selection criteria, were recruited from Prolific Academic. 
Median completion time was 5.87 min (SD = 2.41) and participants were paid £1.50 
(resulting in an effective hourly wage of £15.33/hour for participation). 
Experiment 2: Materials and procedure  
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The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 for all aspects aside 
from the shared reliability/independence manipulation. In Experiment 1, the description 
of shared reliability contained a valuation of the excellence of the school (excellent or 
bad reputation). Here, having read the same initial reports as in Experiment 1, 
participants saw the following:  
“It turns out, all the interviewed economists [biologists] studied at the same [different] 
school and subscribe to the same economic theories. You do not yet know whether this 
school has either a bad reputation for poor teaching and out-dated approaches to the 
economy, or, a good reputation for excellent teaching and up-to-date approaches to the 
economy. 
Given the fact that they all studied at the same [different] school and follow the same 
economic theories, how likely is the UK stock market to crash within the next 6 months?” 
 
Following this, posterior beliefs, (P(H|Rep1) and P(H|Rep1,….,RepN),were elicited in the 
same way as in Experiment 1. Participants either saw only the shared dependency 
condition or the independent condition.  
Experiment 2: Results 
The probability manipulations were successful in generating high and low estimates 
for the two scenarios: The market crash scenario was rated as unlikely (M = .28, SD = 
.24) and the salmon growth scenario was rated as likely (M = .79, SD = .13), replicating 
Experiment 1. Participants rated both sources in our scenarios higher (P(RelEconomist): M = 
.56, SD = .20; P(RelBiologist): M = .73, SD = .15). Importantly, both sources were once 
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again rated positively, which allowed us to test whether positive reports of unlikely 
hypotheses influenced reliability estimates negatively.  
As in Experiment 1, to test whether participants revise their belief in the reliability 
of the source in line with Bayesian predictions (hypothesis 1), we explore if participants 
adjusted reliability estimates in the initial source given sequential testimonies. Bayesian 
predictions dictated that positive reports of an unlikely hypothesis should initially 
decrease estimates of reliability. 
 
Figure. 3. Displayed are the mean participant estimate of the probability that the claim, H, 
is true, before receipt of the reports and then after receipt of each of the three, 
sequentially received, testimonial reports, along with the mean estimate of the reliability 
of source 1, Rel1, prior to any reports, P(Rel1), and then after each additional report (i.e., 
P(Rel1|Rep1), P(Rel1|Rep1,Rep2) and P(Rel1|Rep1,Rep2,Rep3)) both for likely, (P(H) = .79, 
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and unlikely, P(H) = .28), scenarios. Error bars reflect +/- 1 Standard Error. The y-axis 
shows estimated probabilities expressed in decimal form (0-1). Data are plotted 
separately for the high- and low likelihood condition 
 
In line with predictions, using a repeated measures ANOVA (P(Rel1) – 
P(Rel1|Rep1))
10, the perceived reliability of source 1 is revised negatively (i.e. decreases 
compared with baseline reliability) given a positive report of an unlikely hypothesis (N = 
100), BF10 = 352.67 (in the current design, the source predicts the stock market will crash 
within a 6-month period). However (and also in line with Bayesian model predictions), as 
participants learn other experts provide corroborating reports (P(Rel1|Rep1) – 
P(Rel1|Rep1, Rep2, Rep3)), they revise their belief in the initial source and revise 
reliability in a positive direction (N = 100), BF10 = 73321.36, again replicating 
Experiment 1.  
In addition, we again find that participants increase their belief in the likelihood of 
the hypothesis whilst they simultaneously decrease belief in the source reliability (P(H) 
to P(H|Rep1); N = 100), BF10 = 2.43 * 10
6. 
To test whether sources that provide positive statements for highly likely 
hypotheses increase their reliability (hypothesis 2), we conducted a repeated measures 
ANOVA (P(Rel1) to P(Rel1|Rep1, Rep2 ,Rep3)) to see if the reports change the estimation 
of the reliability of the biologist. We find a substantial increase in reliability as more 
reports are given (N = 100), BF10 = 1269.77, replicating Experiment 1.  
 
10 Where P(Rel1) = P(RelProfession), that is, the prior reliability of source 1 is the generic prior for that type of source 
(economist or biologist). 
31 
 
 
The introduction of shared reliability 
To test whether source dependence impacts reliability estimations (hypothesis 3), 
we compared posterior degrees of belief in the hypothesis and the reliability of the 
sources before and after a shared reliability (SR) is introduced. As described above, we 
manipulate the reliability of the SR and compare P(H|Rep1, Rep2, Rep3) with P(H| Rep1, 
Rep2, Rep3, SR) and P(Rel1|Rep1, Rep2,Rep3) with P(Rel1| Rep1, Rep2, Rep3, SR) when 
that SR is an indication of shared or independent (different) schooling, with the former 
predicted by Bayesian models to reduce belief in the reported hypothesis and estimated 
reliability of sources.  
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on belief in the hypothesis (P(H)) for 
the introduction of the shared reliability information (i.e. P(H|Rep1,Rep2,Rep3) to P(H| 
Rep1, Rep2, Rep3,SR)), with the inclusion of the shared reliability condition 
(shared/independent) as a between-subjects condition. 
In the unlikely scenario, we do not observe significant main effects for the 
introduction of additional reliability information, or whether that reliability was shared or 
different. However, focusing on the introduction of shared reliability information alone 
(N = 51), there is a significant reduction in belief in the hypothesis, BF10 = 23.19. This 
reduction is not observed in the condition where the additional reliability information 
indicates sources went to different schools (N = 49), BF10 = 0.22.  
There is a general decrease in reliability estimates given the introduction of 
additional reliability information, BFInclusion = 31.01, but no main effect of shared 
reliability condition or a significant interaction. The model with all terms included was 
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the best fit, BFM = 3.28, and strong overall, BF10 = 41.22. Following the same split as 
above, we note that it is the introduction of shared reliability information alone that drives 
the reduction in reliability estimates (N = 51), BF10 = 105.17, whilst the introduction of 
different school reliability information leads to no such reduction (N = 49), BF10 = 0.32. 
Taken together, we find evidence in support of hypothesis 3, that the introduction 
of the possibility of shared reliability (i.e., source dependence), leads to a decrease in 
estimates of reliability and belief in the hypothesis. 
The above analyses were then repeated for the likely scenario, where, in line with 
predictions, the belief in the hypothesis (salmon growth) was found to substantially 
decrease when additional reliability information is introduced, BFInclusion = 657.1. When 
this information indicated a shared reliability, belief in the hypothesis was substantially 
lower than when this information indicated different schooling, BFInclusion = 80.5. The 
model with all terms included was the best fit, BFM = 120.39, and strong overall, BF10 = 
31290.43. As with the unlikely scenario, we confirm that the reduction in belief in the 
hypothesis is driven by the introduction of shared reliability information (N = 51), BF10 = 
1621.75, whilst there is no evidence for a reduction in belief in the hypothesis as a 
consequence of introducing different reliability information (N = 49), BF10 = 0.3. 
Lastly, the additional reliability information was found to decrease reliability 
estimates, BFInclusion = 250.70, but significantly more so when that information indicated a 
shared reliability, BFInclusion = 4.04. The model with the above terms included was the best 
fit, BFM = 5.68, and substantial overall, BF10 = 545.55. Again, as in the unlikely scenario, 
we confirm that the reduction in reliability estimates is driven by the introduction of 
shared reliability information (N = 51), BF10 = 91.13, whilst there is no evidence for a 
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reduction reliability estimates as a consequence of introducing different reliability 
information (N = 49), BF10 = 0.67. 
 
 
Figure. 4: Mean participant estimate of the probability that the claim after the third 
testimonial report, P(H|Rep1,Rep2,Rep3) along with the mean estimate of the reliability of 
source 1 after the third testimonial report P(Rel1|Rep1,Rep2,Rep3). Mean participant 
estimate of the probability that the claim after learning sources are dependent, P(H| Rep1, 
Rep2, Rep3,SR) along with the mean estimate of the reliability of source 1 after learning 
sources are dependent P(Rel1| Rep1, Rep2, Rep3,SR), split by SR condition (facet) and 
scenario (linetype; P(H) = .79 and P(H) = .28). Error bars reflect +/- 1 Standard Error. 
The y-axis shows estimated probabilities expressed in percentages. Data are plotted 
separately for the high- and low likelihood condition 
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Finally, as in Experiment 1, to test whether participants adjust reliability estimates of 
sources retrospectively, or if additional reports only reflect on the most recent sources 
(hypothesis 4), we conducted a repeated measures ANOVA across the source reliability 
estimates of all sources. Specifically, we compared participant reliability estimates of 
source1 after all reports have been provided. This revealed a null difference in the 
estimated reliability of sources in the unlikely scenario (N = 100), BF10 = 0.067, but a 
minor – yet significant – difference in the likely scenario (N = 100), BF10 = 12.4. 
Although imperfect, this is again suggestive of people updating their belief in source1 
retroactively given new reports from additional sources, even if source1 does not 
contribute with additional reports, in line with Bayesian model predictions. 
Discussion and concluding remarks 
The paper explores how sequential testimonies and partial dependence modulates 
reliability estimates of sources. Across two experiments we explored four hypotheses:  
First, we tested whether participants revised their posterior degree of belief in the 
reliability of sources in line with Bayesian predictions. The data supports this prediction, 
as P(Rel) initially decreased given a positive report of an unlikely hypothesis, but 
subsequently increased as more positive reports were observed.  
Second, we tested whether sources that provide positive statements for highly likely 
hypotheses increase their reliability, but to a lesser extent. The data provides indicative 
support for this, as reliability of sources remained almost constant in the scenario with a 
likely prior probability. 
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Third, we tested whether the introduction of a partial source dependence (i.e., 
shared background) led to an adjustment in reliability estimates in line with Bayesian 
predictions. The data provides support for this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, we showed 
that participants could reason appropriately from specific observations of a shared 
background: When participants learned the experts attended the same school, they 
adjusted their posterior degree of belief negatively, both for the hypothesis and the 
reliability of each source. In line with expectations, this effect was stronger if the experts’ 
school was of low-quality as compared to high-quality. In Experiment 2, we extended this 
finding to show that participants can appropriately reason from the introduction of a 
shared reliability form of dependence – irrespective of an observed value (i.e., revising 
estimates appropriately after learning experts attended the same school, without yet 
knowing the quality of that school). Put another way, we find participants are 
appropriately sensitive to the introduction of a shared reliability dependency relation. 
Finally, we tested if participants revised their posterior degree of belief in the 
reliability of sources retrospectively. The data supports this hypothesis, as source1 
initially decreased when reporting an unlikely hypothesis. Yet, as sources2-3 provided 
similar reports, reliability of source1 was adjusted in line with the n
th source (enjoying the 
same reliability as source2 after 2 reports, mutatis mutandis with source2-3 after 3 reports). 
Overall, the data provides preliminary empirical evidence that lay reasoners are, at least 
qualitatively, sensitive to key features of the dynamics of the Bayesian model predictions 
(Bovens and Hartmann, 2003) 
Interestingly, along with the revision of reliability, participants also revised beliefs 
in the hypothesis along expected lines, increasing their degrees of belief when a reliable 
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source provides a positive report for the hypothesis – this is in line with previous 
Bayesian experiments on the impact of source credibility (see e.g. Hahn et al., 2009; 
Harris et al., 2015; Madsen, 2016). Experiment 1 and 2 both support the above 
hypotheses and interpretations.  
Future work 
In our experimental conditions, participants are told that sources have a shared 
background (shared reliability). However, sources may be dependent in other ways. For 
example, they may communicate directly and reach consensus before providing their 
reports (e.g. a jury does so) or dependency may be one-way (source n can see the reports 
of source n-1 before making her statement whilst source n-1 cannot see the reports of 
subsequent sources, see e.g. Pilditch, Hahn, Fenton & Lagnado, under review; Pilditch, 
Hahn & Lagnado, 2018; 2019). Future work should explore how different types of 
dependencies influence the beliefs of the recipient with regards to claim and the 
reliability of the sources.  
The current work provides experimental corroboration of key qualitative features of 
reliability and dependency found in the normative, Bayesian model. Future work could 
use the method employed here to test reliability updating given a much wider range of 
social and information structures, a wider range of hypotheses, different signal strength, 
and differences in shared reliability. In addition, sources in the present study were 
domain-general (biologists and economists). Future work might interrogate the degree 
domain-specific expertise functions (e.g. biologists who specialize in Norwegian salmon 
compared with more generic expertise markers). Finally, in the current design, 
participants were told of the shared reliability after having seen (supposedly) independent 
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reports. Future studies might manipulate when and how participants experience the 
shared reliability between sources. The findings shed light on how people gauge source 
reliability and integrate reports when multiple sources weigh in on an issue as seen in 
public debates.  
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